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ABSTRACT 
The paper examines how legal, economic, political and social institutions fare 
with different measures of inequality in a cross section framework. We 
differentiate between institutions based on four categories which are legal, 
economic, political and social. Among legal institutions, rule of law and control 
for corruption have a stronger impact on inequality than voice and 
accountability. We find that countries which practice democracy are less prone 
to unequal outcomes especially when it comes to wage inequality and income 
inequality whereas autocracy is associated with higher level of wage inequalities 
but its impact on income inequalities are insignificant. Though under good 
economic management, autocracies may redistribute incomes from the richest 
to the poorest, more generally an autocratic set up violates the median voter 
hypothesis. The results also show that political stability is more sensitive to 
inequalities than democracy and autocracy which is to say that the countries 
which are politically stable also form more equal societies. Though in a cross 
section analysis, our results indicate average sample characteristics of countries 
chosen which neutralise the single country case sensitivities and thus may have 
captured the simple observational analogy that most democracies in the world 
are also the ones which are politically stable and economically efficient whereas 
most autocracies, unless they are lead by enlightened leadership eventually 
suffer from unstable or repressed political systems. Economic institutions also 
play an important role in alleviating global inequalities. Whether the 
government is functioning effectively and whether it has a robust fiscal and 
monetary policy seems to have stronger impact on inequality than regulatory 
quality. Education for all, a proxy for social institutions, has a strong 
redistributive power. Overall, political stability, control for corruption and rule 
of law trumps any other institutional proxy in reducing inequalities in a 
country. On the other hand, middle income group is most likely to benefit 
from good functioning institutions than any other income group. Once 
controlling for institutions, openness is associated with increased wage 
inequalities across nations. However the results for trade policy are mixed. 
Decrease in import taxes increase wage inequality, whereas decrease in export 
taxes has an egalitarian effect. The results are applicable only to a larger sample 
of developed and developing countries and highlight the bottle neck faced by 
both developing and developed countries in WTO talks which have not been 
successful as yet in further decrease in trade taxes. In case the situation 
prevails, the paper calls for more South-South trade which would enable 
developing countries to decrease the relative wage gaps among labour force. 
Keywords 
Redistribution, Inequality, Cross Section Models 
JEL Codes:  
O1, N40 
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GOOD INSTITUTIONS AND FAIR TRADE: 
A Road Map to Local and Global Social Harmony 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Today, it has come to us as a cliché that the world is a global village. One may 
ask as to what are the social and economic characteristics of this global village 
when around the globe information is just a click away to individuals or it is 
increasingly made available to them by their local, regional or global media 
outlets? As one looks through the eyes of the media, it seems that the world is 
ever dividing into conflicting political and social ideologies as different interest 
groups are striving for different realities. Nevertheless, here one can safely say 
that economics has been resolute to bring a single mutually acceptable point of 
reference to different stakeholders connecting the concepts of fair globalisation 
with economic empowerment, freedom of speech, human rights and 
preservation of environment. Unlike business ethics, in economics all is not 
about profit making but it is about maintaining efficiency while harnessing 
social harmony.  
In an effort to achieve economic efficiency, most countries have 
dismantled their barriers to international trade in goods and services during the 
last couple of decades. As a result, the size of world trade in goods and services 
has dramatically increased. Few success stories have also emerged as an 
outcome of contemporary globalisation. China and India, have witnessed 
unprecedented rise in their growth rates as well as significant poverty 
alleviation. However for most countries, globalisation has come with mixed 
experiences. Most rich and middle income countries are experiencing rising 
economic inequality generated by skill biased technological change, 
international trade and other factors related to globalisation (Smeeding, 2002). 
Despite integration to the world economy, most countries of Latin America, 
Africa (i.e, Sub Saharan Africa) and some in Asia have failed to accomplish 
decent growth rates. In many countries in the South, poverty has increased. 
Even if some could grow at a decent rate, they have failed to put a downward 
pressure on the increasing trends in poverty levels. For example, Pakistan, 
which has recently witnessed a growth rate of 8 percent, has witnessed increase 
in poverty levels from 30 percent to 35 percent as of 2005. Even in China and 
India, the falling poverty trends are not sustainable, as there is an evidence of 
rapid rising inequalities.  
Though, the recent literature suggests that international trade and strong 
institutions are the key determinants of growth ( i.e, see Dollar and Kraay, 
2003; Rodrik et al, 2004; Glaeser et al, 2004a, Mamoon and Murshed, 2005, in 
the retrospect, the problem of poverty can not be separated from the way in 
which growth is achieved. So, other than economic growth, what is the point 
of reference to economic development especially when it is about ensuring 
equity? Under global processes of production where trading societies learn and 
coordinate among each other to find common grounds for carrying out 
contemporary social norms which fits into international standards where 
business protects labour rights, promotes gender sensitivity, brings efficient 
social welfare system while following best commerce practices, there are 
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myriad of common institutions which simultaneously play a role in facilitating 
each country’s smooth exposure to global markets and international 
competition. Thus it is important to look at the different institutional setups; 
countries may have while working along with the surge of globalisation. 
One of the most commonly quoted institutional factor for determining 
any country’s intellectual, social, economic and cultural progress is the so called 
notion of Democracy. Since all developed nations are well practiced 
democracies, this notion generally forms the popular opinion that democracy is 
the first step to any country’s progress. However to change the kaleidoscope a 
bit, one may also argue that it is their very own economic progress which has 
been able to sustain democracy in the West. Definitely it is well developed 
combination of social, legal, political and economic institutions which has 
worked in an intricate net of coordination to sustain Western economic 
progress and thus enabling the region to maintain its scientific niche. But 
where did the West really started it all? There are different answers for 
different times. For example, to go down in time line, say a 100 years, Western 
economic progress has been linked to colonialism which was an act of resource 
exploitation and dictatorial precedence in the garb of monarchies rather than 
following any course of democratic values. Today, Western economic models 
work under the prime of information accuracy and thus keep their edge over 
other regions based on their enhanced level of technology culture.  
In developing countries, there has been evidence of rapid economic 
progress leading to democracy or moving towards democratically aligned 
economic models of governance. China, South Korea and Taiwan have been 
growing under one-party dictatorships, the last two eventually turning to 
democracy whereas China now seriously pushing for property rights to protect 
private ownership in the country. Recently, Pakistan has become one of the 
fastest growing economies of the region, even surpassing India, under General 
Musharraf. Among the transition economies, rapid economic growth was 
achieved by Kazakhastan under Nazarbaev. Here one may conveniently 
assume that these countries have performed well under market friendly policies 
and thus successfully achieved robust economic performance. However the 
analogy is not that simple and mere good economics is not enough to sustain 
economic progress. Market friendly policies may not work in the absence of 
good institutions. The failure of Russian economy and its reform process can 
be attributed to the lack of a supportive legal, regulatory and political 
apparatus. In Latin America little attention has been paid to the mechanisms of 
social insurance and to the safety nets which has resulted in the dissatisfaction 
with market oriented reforms. India, in comparison to the countries mentioned 
above, is not only known as the largest democracy in the world due to the 
sheer size of its population but. India is also one of the fastest growing 
economies but it has a precedence of sound legal institutions. Due to robust 
legal institutions, the country is politically less volatile when compared to for 
example its neighbour Pakistan, even though both countries have in recent 
decades seen an emergence of multiparty governance setups. However, being 
developing countries as they are, much like Latin America, social institutions 
are underdeveloped which may mean that a well meaning democracy may still 
not exist in Indian case till economic progress reach out to the masses and 
benefits the impoverished peripheries. It may also be the case that some 
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institutions may be more important than others. For example, even pro-market 
dictators can secure property rights as a matter of policy choice (Glaeser, 
2004a). Similarly, stronger social institutions lead to improved government 
functioning: “Education is needed for courts to operate and to empower 
citizens to engage with government institutions (Ibid. 2004: 3)” 
Thus to analyse what makes it tick for good economics where not only 
economic growth is achieved but its economic dividends are also distributed 
equally among different strata of population especially in case of developing 
countries, a cross section analysis of developed and developing countries has 
been carried out in this paper where different institutional variables along with 
different proxies of openness/trade policy are employed while focusing their 
impact on inequality.  
2 INEQUALITY AS IMPORTANT AS GROWTH  
Though the world after the very surge of colonialism transformed into a land 
of unequal opportunities, last century has witnessed a worse deal where global 
inequalities have partly lead to regional inequalities and then the come back of 
contemporary globalisation entailing post modernism had brought inequality to 
the very door step of each country where rural and urban divides have been 
ever increasing so much so that recently it has become of policy importance to 
consider inequality as a significant factor which may stifle growth promoting 
strategies and even reverse what good growth may bring to the society.  
To account for inequality trends recently observed in developing countries 
one may start from Latin America where recently high levels of inequalities 
have been observed in most countries. For example, partly due to the recession 
in the 1980s, which hit the poor harder than the rich, inequality in most Latin 
American states except for three (Colombia, Uruguay and Costa Rica) witness 
sharp rises. Gini coefficients in Latin America have been ranged between 0.45 
and 0.60 since early 1950s, which are among the highest in the world. The 
acute polarisation of income has been rooted in a highly unequal distribution 
of land and educational opportunities (Cornia et al, 2004). These prevalent 
inequalities are still stifling the economic potential of the region while 
institutions remain underdeveloped.  
In China income concentration has been rising rapidly since 1985 so that 
the Gini coefficient reached 0.43 by 1995 and remained more or less at the 
same level until recently. The rise in income disparity can be attributed to a rise 
in urban-rural divide arising from a faster expansion of urban activities amid 
active participation of China in international markets. Among South East 
Asian economies, the Gini coefficient for Indonesia increased to 0.38 by 1997 
from 0.32 in 1987-90. In South Asia, inequality also followed a U-shaped 
pattern, though it was less pronounced. In India, the experience of 1990s 
points to a moderate rise in both urban and rural inequality and a larger rise in 
overall inequality due to widening gap between urban and rural areas. In 1990s 
the urban inequality rose to 0.36. The Gini coefficient in Pakistan rose from 
0.39 in 1960s to 0.41 in 1990s. Much like India, the rise in overall inequality is 
attributed to a sharp rise in rural inequalities. Inequality in Sub Saharan Africa 














rural gap but there is rising intra urban and at times intra rural inequalities. For 
example, in Tanzania the Gini coefficient for rural inequality rose from 0.53 in 
early 1980s to 0.76 in early 1990s. Similarly for Kenya, the rural inequalities 
increased by 9 points from 1980 to 1992 and stand at 0.49 (Ibid. 2004). 
3 DIFFERENT TYPES OF INSTITUTIONS, INTEGRATION, 
INEQUALITY AND THE ENDOGENISING FACTORS: 
There are issues of two way causality between inequality and institutions (i.e., 
see Keefer and Knack, 2002; Chong and Gradstein, 2004), between different 
types of institutions as shown by figure 1 and discussed below. Many recent 
studies ( i.e., see Chen and Ravallion , 2003; Cockburn, 2001; Friedman, 2000; 
Lofgren, 1999) show that international trade is significantly related with 
inequality while institutions and integration are also endogenous (i.e., Rodrik et 
al, 2004). Any empirical analysis which takes institutions as a pure exogenous 
factor while analysing its effects on inequality may lead to miss-specification 
bias. Here on the line of Ridrik et al. (2004), we assume geography is a pure 
endogenous concept. 
FIGURE 1 
Endogeniety between Institutions, Integration and Inequality 
 
 9
Chong and Gradstein (2004) find strong evidence of bi-directional 
causality between institutions and inequality. Inequality may affect the quality 
of institutions. For example, high inequality will prevent the poor from 
investing in education or the ruling class may not invest in education so that 
the poor majority will not be politically active thus undermining the 
development of necessary social and political institutions. Easterly (2001) and 
Keefer and Knack (2002) suggests that social polarisation negatively affects 
institutional quality. For example, rising inequalities may lead to political 
instability and even civil unrest.  
The countries with poor institutions are also likely to have high inequality. 
For example in Russia in the 1990s, a small group of entrepreneurs exploited 
their political power to promote their own interests, subverting the emergence 
of institutions committed to the protection of smaller share holders and 
businesses. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index published by 
Transparency International, among the transition economies, Estonia is placed 
28, and Hungary 31; whereas Russia is placed 79, and Ukraine 83. In these 
transition economies, weak performance of public institutions, infringement of 
property rights in favour of influential parties, lower willingness to use courts 
to resolve business disputes, lower level of tax compliance and higher levels of 
bribery all have been strongly correlated with inequality (Hellman and 
Kaufman, 2002). Similarly, in several Latin American countries, the ruling 
elites, the military and large businesses impeded smaller business interests 
giving rise to significant informal sector. Chong and Gradstein (2004) show 
that when the political bias in favour of the rich is large, income inequality and 
poor institutional quality may reinforce each other, indicating endogeniety 
between the two. 
There may also be inter-linkages between various institutions. For 
example, nearly all developed countries are democracies and most developing 
countries are either run under one party system, dictatorships or military 
regimes. The countries with lower levels of economic and human development 
tend to have lower levels of education, limited political rights, weak or non 
existent political competition, lower level of economic freedom and openness, 
ethno linguistic factionalism, the lack of judicial independence and a free press 
and high levels of permissiveness towards corruption.  
Before discussing the interdependence of different institutions we would 
first like to differentiate between them. We identify four types of institutions: 
1) Legal, 2) Political, 3) Economic and 4) Social. Legal institutions capture the 
transparency and fairness of legal system, political rights of the citizens, State 
legitimacy, freedom of speech, independence of judiciary, enforceability of 
contracts, police effectiveness, access to independent and impartial courts, 
confidence in judicial system in insuring property rights, prevention of 
improper practices in public sphere, control of corruption etc. Political 
institutions represent political stability, democracy, autocracy or dictatorship. 
Economic institutions include state effectiveness at collecting taxes or other 
forms of government revenue, states ability to create, deliver and maintain vital 
national infrastructure, states ability to respond effectively to domestic 
economic problems, independence of government economic policies from 
pressure from special interest groups, trade and foreign exchange system, 
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competition policy, privatisation, banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation, securities market and non bank financial institutions etc. Social 
Institutions capture socio economic conditions such as health, education and 
nutrition etc.  
The legal, political, economic and social institutions are strong in 
developed countries and for developing countries there are mixed experiences. 
For example, intellectual property rights are protected vigorously in the US and 
most advanced societies, but not in many developing countries (Rodrik, 1999). 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) link the development of public education as a 
social institution to the democratization as a political process in US. According 
to them, while starting at about the similar level of development in the 18nth 
century, US led the way in setting up a system of common schools and 
promoting literacy, where as in countries in South America and the Caribbean 
these processes were much delayed. Gupta et al. (1998) finds that if 
government officials use their authority for private gain and indulge in 
corruption that affects the effectiveness of social spending and the formation 
of human capital by perpetuating an unequal distribution of asset ownership 
and unequal access to education. Corruption also affects the government 
effectiveness as it weakens tax administration and can lead to tax evasion and 
improper tax evasion and improper tax exemptions. Higher corruption is 
associated with increases in inequalities in education, land distribution and 
health spending. Wealthy urban elites can lobby the government to bias social 
expenditure toward higher education and tertiary health, which tend to benefit 
high income groups (ibid., 1998).  
Furthermore, trade opening in societies with weak institutions may lead to 
worse economic policies (Segura-Cayuela, 2005). For example, those transition 
economies where trade reforms were implemented slowly and the government 
institutions were able to perform well with time, smaller increase in inequality 
and smaller output decline is occurred. However, the transition economies 
with weak government setups have performed as ‘passive globalizers’ and the 
trade-to-GDP ratios in them were quite high, partly accounting for capital 
flight, while poverty and inequality was increased (Yudaeva, 2002).  
4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Much recently Kaufman et al. (2002) formulated aggregate governance 
indicators for six dimensions of governance covering 175 countries. They 
relied on 194 different measures of governance drawn from 17 different 
sources of subjective governance data constructed by 15 different sources 
including international organizations, political and business risk rating agencies, 
think tanks and non governmental organizations. The governance indicators 
have been oriented so that higher values correspond to better outcomes on a 
scale from -2.5 to 2.5. They are categorized as rule of law (Rl), political stability 
(Ps), regulatory quality (Rq), government effectiveness (Ge), voice and 
accountability (Va) and control of corruption (Ctc). We divide them into four 
classification based on their definitions. We consider Rl, Va and Ctc as legal 
institutions. Ge and Rq are dubbed as economic institutions whereas Ps is taken 
as a proxy for Political institutions. We add two more political indicators 
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namely democracy (Demo) and autocracy (Auto) to our analysis from Polity 
dataset whereas, both ranging from 0 to 10. We have also included social 
institutions in our analysis. Average Schooling Years in the total population at 
25 (Sch) and Adult literacy rate (Altr) capture the quality of social institutions.  
As we mention above, international trade is also a significant determinant 
of inequalities in countries across the globe, integration enters our regression 
model to enhance its explanatory power. We incorporate not 1 but 8 various 
concepts of openness and trade policy in our regression model in order to 
carry out a robustness check for our results on institutions. We have carefully 
chosen three specific measures of openness. The ratio of nominal imports plus 
exports to GDP (lcopen) is the conventional openness indicator (see Frankel 
and Romer, 1999; Alcala and Ciccone, 2002; Rose, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 
2003; Rodrik et al., 2004). Two other measures of openness are overall trade 
penetration (tarshov) derived from World Bank’s TARS system and overall 
import penetration (Impnov) respectively (see Rose, 2002). Neither of these 
measures are direct indicators of trade policy of a country, pointing only 
towards the level of its participation in international trade. There are indicators 
of trade restrictiveness acting as measures of trade policy (Edwards, 1998; 
Greenaway et al., 2001, Rose 2002). Import tariffs as percentage of imports 
(Tariffs), tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owti), trade taxes as a 
ratio of overall trade (Txtrg) and total import charges (Totimpov) can all be 
considered as good proxies for trade restrictiveness and have also been 
employed in our study. Other measures which capture restrictions in overall 
trade are non-tariff barriers. We use overall non-tariff coverage (Ntarfov) and 
non-tariff barriers on intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owqi) as two 
proxies for non-tariff barriers (see Rose, 2002). Moreover there is also a trend 
in the trade literature to use composite measures of trade policy. Edwards 
(1998) advocates the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index (Open80) as a 
proxy for openness. 
To capture inequality we not only take GINI income inequality index 
(Gini) from UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) but 
also we employ UTIP-UNIDO Theil measure (Theil) calculated by University 
of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) which captures wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled labour. This is motivated by several considerations. First, 
comparable and consistent measures of income inequality, whether on a 
household level or per head basis are difficult, almost implausible and generally 
fails to provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-country coverage. 
On the other hand, inequality of manufacturing pay, based on UNIDO 
Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that are more stable, more 
reliable and more comparable across countries because UNIDO measures are 
based on a two or three digit code of International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) a single systematic accounting framework. Furthermore, 
manufacturing pay has been measured with reasonable accuracy as a matter of 
official routine in most countries around the world for nearly forty years 
(Galbraith and Kum, 2002). Further more we take income deciles and 
percentiles from UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) as 
other proxies of inequality. Institutions or Integration will be guilty of 
inequality if it has the negative impact on the incomes of bottom 10 percent 
(low10) and positive impact on the income of the top 10 percent (high10). We 
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also take income groups divided into quintiles where the effect of Institutions 
is anticipated to be negative for the ratio between top 20 percent and bottom 
20 percent (high20/low20) and positive for the middle income groups 
(Middle20). The exercise on income deciles and percentiles will further shed 
light on how institutions and integration are related with income distribution. 
Especially, we are interested to know how quality of institutions are related 
with the incomes of the middle class or the ones living in bottom of income 
share. Each country observation for all inequality measures is taken for the 
latest year for which data is available and in most cases represent inequality in 
mid 1990s. 
Our basic inequality and income share equations would look like: 
Inequality = f (Institutions, Integration, Geography)  (1) 
and  
Income Share= f (Institutions, Integration, Geography) (2) 
Corresponding to equation 1, our inequality model based on Theil index 
has 8 equations, whereas each equation corresponds to a different institutional 
or integration classification The model specifications for Gini, High20/Low20, 
Midlle20, Low10 and High10 contain same 8 equations each with same variable 
specifications.  
iiii OpenLITheil 11111 εχβα +++=  (3) 
iiii OpenPITheil 22222 εχβα +++=  (4) 
iiii OpenEITheil 33333 εχβα +++=  (5) 
iiii OpenSITheil 44444 εχβα +++=  (6) 
iiii TPLITheil 55555 εχβα +++=  (7) 
iiii TPPITheil 66666 εχβα +++=  (8) 
iiii TPEITheil 77777 εχβα +++=  (9) 
iiii TPSITheil 88888 εχβα +++=  (10) 
The variable is Theil Index in a country I, iLI , iPI , iEI , and iSI and are 
respectively measures for legal, political, economic and social institutions, 
whereas iOpen  measures general openness in the economy and iTP  is a 
measure for trade policy and iε  is the random error term. Please refer to 
appendix 1 for information on equations based on Gini, High20/Low20, 
Middle20, Low20 and High10. 
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As we have discussed, there are potential endogenity problems between 
institutions and integration and between institutions and inequality itself. To 
this effect we have first regressed our institutional, trade policy and openness 
proxies on a set of instruments. Frankel and Romer (1999) suggests that we 
can instrument for openness by using trade/GDP shares constructed on the 
basis of a gravity equation for bilateral trade flows. The FR approach consists 
of first regressing bilateral trade flows (as a share of country’s GDP) on 
measures of country mass, distance between the trade partners, and a few other 
geographical variables, and then constructing a predicted aggregate trade share 
for each country on the basis of coefficients estimated. Hall and Jones (1999) 
employed distance from the equator and the extent to which the primary 
languages of Western Europe are spoken as first languages today as 
instruments for institutions. Hall and Jones made an argument that the 
instruments are not correlated with the error term. Acemolgu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) identify the mortality of European settlers as a potential 
instrument. Using two ex post assessments of institutional quality – risk of 
expropriation by the government and constraints on the executive – as 
measures of institutions, they showed that settler mortality is a strong predictor 
of institutions. However there are two drawbacks for AJR instrument. First, 
the data is only available for 64 countries. Though Rodrik et al. (2004) have 
extended it to 80 countries; it still covers a relatively low number when 
compared to ‘the extent to which the primary languages of Western Europe are 
spoken as first languages today’ which covers as many as 140 countries. 
Secondly, according to Glaeser et al. (2004b), AJR instrument of settler 
mortality fails to be orthogonal to the error term. ‘Settler mortality is strongly 
correlated not just with ancient, but also with the modern, decease 
environment, suggesting that it might be the decease environment, rather than 
history, that matters for economic development. Secondly settler mortality is 
strongly correlated with human capital accumulation, suggesting that it cannot 
be used as an instrument for institutions (Glasear et al., 2004b:8).’ Thus 
following Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Hall and Jones (1999), we use ‘fractions 
of the population speaking English (Engfrac) and Western European languages 
as the first language (Eurfrac)’ as an instrument for legal, economic and political 
institutions. Since we are using years of schooling and adult literacy rate as a 
proxy for social institutions we looked for instruments which can capture the 
qualitative and quantitative properties in education sector. Total public 
spending on education (as a percentage of GDP) and primary public-teacher 
ratio are the two instruments proposed by Mamoon and Murshed (2005). The 
former instrument captures the quality of education and the later instrument 
captures the quantity of education. As in Rodrik et al. (2004), we employ 
‘distance from the equator’ as another instrument (proxy for geography) also 
employed by Hall and Jones (1999). 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngLI 111111 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ  (11) 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngPI 222222 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ  (12) 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngEI 333333 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ  (13) 
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iiiii DisteqFREurEngOpen 4444441 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ  (14) 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngTP 5555551 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ  (15) 
iiiii DisteqFRPtrTlexSI 666666 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ  (16) 
iiiii DisteqFRPtrTlexOpen 7777772 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ  (17) 
iiiii DisteqFRPtrTlexTP 8888882 Ε+++++= τϑθςσ  (18) 
Where and are our instruments for legal, economic and political 
institutions referring to fractions of population speaking English and European 
languages respectively. Tlex is total public spending on education as a 
percentage of GDP and Ptr is primary pupil-teacher ratio and both are 
instruments for average years of schooling and adult literacy rate. is instrument 
for openness and trade policy. is proxy for geography showing distance from 
the equator. At the second stage the predicted values of respective institutional, 
openness and trade policy variables are employed in the inequality and income 
share equations.  
5 RESULTS 
5.1 Legal Institutions 
Voice and Accountability stands for the following (i) Does State legitimately 
represent its citizens (ii) Legal system/ transparency and fairness (iii) Political 
rights (iv) Freedom of speech (v) Business have voice to express and they are 
informed (Kaufman et al, 2002). The channels of communication are vital for 
development, particularly for electoral democracies that are in the process of 
establishing more effective political and economic institutions. In societies 
where press freedom is combined with wide spread access to the mass media 
this is positively associated with good governance and with human 
development, through the role of the press in promoting the voice of 
disadvantaged groups in the policy making process and strengthening the 
accountability of governments to citizens and thus decreasing inequality 
(Norris, 2001:8).  
Rule of Law captures (i) Enforceability of contracts (ii) Losses and costs of 
crime (iii) Kidnapping of foreigners (iv) crime (v) Corruption of bank officials 
(vi) Extent of tax evasion (vii) Costs of organised crime for business (viii) 
Police effectiveness in safeguarding personal security (ix) independence of the 
judiciary from interference by the government and/or parties to the dispute (x) 
Private business has recourse to independent and impartial courts for 
challenging the legality of government (xi) Financial assets and wealth are well 
protected (xii) Private business are more likely to settle disputes outside court 
(xiii) Concern with level of crime (xiv) Black market (xv) Property rights (xvi) 
Feeling of personal safety (xvii) Equal opportunities to access justice (xviii) 
Equality before the law (xix) Courts – fair and impartial (xx) courts – 
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affordable (xxi) Courts – consistent (xxii) Court’s enforceability (xxiii) 
Confidence in judicial system today in insuring property rights (xxiv) General 
constraint – functioning of judiciary (xxv) Obstacles to competition – violation 
of patents (xxvi) quality of courts (xxvii) Parallel economy as obstacle to 
business development (Kaufman et al., 2002). 
‘High inequality can impede the economic performance of a country by 
obstructing the formation of governance structures that enhance productivity. 
Where this is the case, inequality is likely to be the result of a distribution of 
property rights that is inefficient as well as inequitable. If so, there may be a 
plausible set of alternative distributions that are both more equitable and more 
efficient; i.e., which foster competition on the basis of a more level playing field.’ 
(Roy and Weeks, 2003: 3)  
Control for Corruption is measured by (i) Improper practices in the public 
sphere (ii) Frequency of additional payments (iii) Dishonest courts (iv) 
Corruption as obstacle to business (v) Bribery (% of Gross Revenues) (vi) State 
Capture (BPS) (vii) Percent of public officials viewed to be corrupt (viii) 
Percent who believe the government is corrupt (ix) Additional Payments: 
bureaucracy (x) Additional payments: judiciary (xi) Severity of corruption 
within the state (xii) Political risk index: Internal causes of political risk: 
Mentality, including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, 
willingness to compromise (Kaufman et al., 2002). 
Barreto (1996) finds that corruption is positively and significantly 
correlated with inequality, implying that increased income inequality is 
associated with greater corruption. Tanzi (1995) argues that the benefits from 
corruption are likely to accrue to the better connected individuals in society, 
who mostly belong to high-income groups. It has been further contended that 
corruption creates incentives for higher investment in capital intensive projects 
and lower investment in labor intensive projects (UNDP, 1997), thus 
increasing the wage inequality. Gupta et al. (1998) show that a worsening of 
corruption index of a country by one standard deviation (2.52 points on a scale 
of 0 to 10) is associated with an increase in the GINI coefficient of about 4.4 
points.  
Tables 1a and 1b (appendix I) show the results for Legal institutions. The 
results suggest that wage inequality (Theil) is more sensitive to legal institutions 
than overall income distribution (Gini). Results based on the ratio of income 
percentiles (High20/Low20) and income deciles show that voice and 
accountability, rule of law and control for corruption has a strong redistributive 
power. The relationship between legal institutions and income of the middle 
income groups (Middle20) as well as low income groups especially for Rl and 
Ctc is positive and significant. This means that good quality legal institutions 
not only to reach out to the middle income groups but they are also altruistic 
to the poorest of the poor. The evidence quite robustly suggests that 
redistribution of income takes place from the richest to the middle class or 
lower middle class as all the three proxies of legal institutions are negatively 
and significantly related with the incomes of the richest 10 percent or 20 
percent in most of the cases.  
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5.2 Economic Institutions 
Government Effectiveness measures (i) Operation Risk Index : Bureaucratic delays 
(ii) State’s ability to formulate and implement national policy initiatives  
(iii) Effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue  
(iv) State’s ability to create, deliver and maintain vital national infrastructure  
(v) State’s ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems  
(vi) Institutional failure: A deterioration of government capacity to cope with 
national problems as a result of institutional rigidity or gridlock  
(vii) Government policy/ Pro-business orientation (viii) Government 
decentralisation, independent and responsibilities or local and regional 
governments, and legislative and executive transparency (ix) Wasteful 
government expenditure (x) Public service vulnerability to political pressure 
(xi) Government economic policies are independent of pressure from special 
interest groups (xii) Quality of public health (xiii) quality of public education 
(xiv) quality of central bank (Kaufman et al., 2002). 
Every government must maintain a sustainable fiscal policy, which 
includes a deficit that is manageable in the short term, and the associated 
public debt it creates being serviceable. More concentration of resources on 
social sector is always pro-poor. The value added tax has received exaggerated 
appreciation and has not faced its due criticism. In the world when poverty 
reduction strategies are implemented and inequalities are growing, value added 
tax needs to give way to more pro poor tax system (Roy and Weeks, 2003). 
Inflation in many developing countries is an outcome of political decision 
when government has a lax monetary policy and is unable or unwilling to 
increase taxes. High inflation has a negative distribution effects. In developed 
countries sometimes monetary policy outcomes are related with increased 
inequalities. Khalifa (2005), shows that a positive shock to Federal Reserve 
fund rates in US induce a larger and more persistent increase in the 
unemployment ratio of the low skilled relative to that of high skilled, indicating 
that low skilled bear the brunt of the increase in unemployment after a 
contractionary policy.  
Regulatory Quality stands for (i) Restrictions on ownership of Business by 
non-residents (ii) Restriction on ownership of equities (iii) Price liberalisation 
(iv) Trade & Foreign exchange system (v) Competition Policy (vi) Commercial 
law effectiveness (vii) Commercial law extensiveness (viii) Financial regulations: 
extensiveness (ix) Financial Regulations: effectiveness (x) Large scale 
privatisation (xi) small scale Privatisation (xii) Governance and enterprise 
restructuring (xiii) Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation (xiv) 
Securities market and non bank financial institutions (xv) Bankruptcy law (xvi) 
Minimal administrative regulations that constrain businesses (xvii) Wage/ Price 
Controls (Kaufman et al, 2002). The results in Table 2 show that regulatory 
quality has weak relationship with the traditional measures of inequality.  
Table 2 (appendix I) indicates that government effectiveness is negatively 
and significantly related with wage inequality between skilled and unskilled. 
However, the relationship is weak at best with Gini. Though it doesn’t mean 
that effectiveness of government policies don’t carry redistributive effects. Our 
results show that if the governments which work in the interest of public; they 
have a significant and positive effect on the incomes of the poor and middle 
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class, where as they are negatively and significantly related with the incomes of 
the elite. The results in Table 1 indicate that though regulatory quality has weak 
relationship with the traditional measures of inequality but it has positive and 
relatively significant effects on the income share of middle income groups.  
5.3 Political Institutions 
We have utilised 3 proxies for political institutions namely, political stability, 
democracy and autocracy. Political stability generally measures for conflict:  
(i) Military coup risk (ii) Major insurgency Rebellion (iii) Political terrorism  
(iv) Political Assassination (v) Civil War (vi) Major Urban Riot (vii) New 
government honors commitments of previous government (Kaufman et al., 
2002). 
There is a rich literature which suggests inequality as a cause of conflict 
and civil violence. For example, Murshed and Gates (2003) find the causes of 
conflict in Nepal to persistent inequalities in the region: ‘It has also to be 
remembered that poverty, the lack of employment opportunities and other 
forms of horizontal inequality assist Maoist recruitment and retention, making 
life in Maoist cadres a relatively attractive options (p.10).’ Justino (2004) shows 
that redistributive policies have played an important role in the prevention and 
reduction of internal unrest in India and have been a central factor in 
preventing smaller scale conflicts from escalating into violent civil wars. 
Though many recent studies show that conflict and civil unrest is endogenous 
to prevalent inequalities, it may also be that these conflicts further deepen 
inequalities in the society. Our results in table 3a (appendix II) show that this is 
exactly what happens. Political stability is the key to a more equal society and it 
is especially favourable to the wages of the unskilled population. Furthermore, 
politically stable societies not only redistribute incomes to the middle income 
groups but they also benefit the lowest segments of the society equally.  
The results in Table 3a (appendix II) indicate that political stability is one 
of the key factors to a more equal society and it is especially favourable to the 
wages of the unskilled population. Furthermore, politically stable societies not 
only redistribute incomes to the middle income groups but they also benefit 
the lowest segments of the society equally. However, in comparison to political 
stability index, democracy has a weak relationship with inequality. The average 
effects of democracy on inequality have generally been insignificant. This is 
inline with the existing evidence which doesn’t find any robust relationship 
between democracy and inequality in a cross country regression. ‘Indeed a 
casual inspection of recent events in East Europe as well as in East Asia casts 
doubts that any such simple relationship may exist. It has been argued that, in 
the East European countries, democratization of the 90’s actually resulted in an 
increase income inequality. Similarly, some of the East Asian countries such as 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore have had among the most egalitarian income 
distributions in the world, yet their political record is far from democratic’ 
(Gradstein et al., 2001: 1). According to Glaeser et al. (2004b), it is good 
leadership that matters and not whether a country has democratic setup or 
ruled under a dictatorship. Nevertheless, our results do show that democracy 
seem to favour middle class more than anybody else confirming the median 
voter argument that democratised countries with greater inequality of factor 
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income tend to redistribute more to the less affluent (Milanovic, 2000). 
However, Democracy appears to be marginally better option than autocracy as 
any cases of significance as is shown in table 3b indicates that on average for 
the comity of nations democracy is good for decreasing wage inequalities, 
where as autocracy seems to move in opposite direction.  
So what lessons can we draw from these results? Should it be that a 
country may compromise on democracy and follow a rather politically 
repressed system lead by a dictatorial rule? Both questions are very applicable 
to developing countries where most of the underperforming economies are 
lead by dictatorial setups whether it is Asia, Africa or Latin America. However 
as mentioned above there are salient exceptions too where it seems that the 
definition of Western democracy has not been fulfilled but an enlightened 
model of economic management has been adopted and success has been 
achieved as far as growth dividends are concerned. So how one may contrast 
such exceptions with the ones where autocracy has lead to repressed market 
structures? Is it all about market efficiency to defend autocratic structure if one 
may wish to? Our results puts some light to these questions if equity and not 
only growth is the objective for a developing country policy apparatus. If some 
how less democratic political system may strengthen legal, social and economic 
institutions and promote political stability, it would not matter whether a 
western model of democracy be implemented by its word and spirit or some 
case specific combination of political and social methodologies are adopted. 
Definitely democracy is not a sufficient condition in itself for contributing 
towards equity or even economic progress of a country. Rather democracy is 
just another part of the jigsaw puzzle which may only fit in properly at its right 
time when other institutional variables have evolved appropriately to support 
its conceptual application. Most democracies must have been autocracies or 
near autocracies when the political process in any country started out and this 
simply means mere concentration on democracy is futile to find solutions for 
institutional or macro economic progress. Rather democracy can be considered 
as a notion suggesting an objective and well developed end for the 
confirmation of economic, social, cultural and scientific development rather 
than a mean to an end. However, in today’s rapidly transforming world where 
some developing countries may benefit from global markets more than others, 
they would find themselves under increasing pressure from their populations 
to transform into a more democratised system of governance once they 
witnessed higher level of economic and institutional development. In such 
scenarios, countries which may be doing good under well defined autocratic set 
ups may not only just have to decide to bring Western models of democracy to 
align their social development with global standards, but most importantly they 
have to decide about the timings of such critical transitions so that the 
economic progress they have achieved is well sustained as any abrupt changes 
may always carry higher risks.  
5.4 Social Institutions 
Education enhances the earnings potential of the poor, both in competing for 
jobs and earnings and as a source of growth and employment. The distribution 
of physical and human capital emerges from the theoretical and empirical 
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literature as the key to distributional consequences of growth, and a 
determinant of growth itself (Kanbur, 1998:20). The results in Table 4 
(appendix II) shows that average years of schooling (Sch) is negatively related 
with the Gini, and the relationship is significant in most cases suggesting 
countries which have a more educated population are also the ones where 
distribution of income is relatively less unequal. For example, in US the 
percapita income of the richest decile exceeds that of second richest decile by 
60 percent only, where as in Latin America where Gini is also one of the 
highest among developing countries, the richest decile exceeds that of the 
second richest decile by 160 percent. In comparison to Latin America, US has 
highly educated population with average years of schooling at little more than 
12 years and 99 percent of the adult population being literate.  
Increased educational attainment also leads to less wage inequality. Along 
with the processes of globalisation the comparative advantage of developed 
nation lies in high skill intensive goods as lower skill intensive goods and 
services are being outsourced to developing nations. As the skill demand is 
increasing at greater pace than its supply, so is the wage of more skilled and 
educated labor thus increasing wage inequalities in developed nations. Harrigan 
and Balaban (1999) show that relative factor supply is an important factor in 
determining the growing return to skill in US during 1963-91. Given the 
current situation of increasing inequality in most developed societies, of which 
globalisation is seen as a much-cited culprit, policy makers have been very keen 
to demand further public funding for schooling (Pereira and Martin, 2000: 2). 
Similarly education inequalities have led to wage inequality in developing 
countries specifically Latin America. Coincidently, Latin America has a Gini 
coefficient (about 0.50 for the region as a whole) which is approximately 15 
points above the average for the rest of the world (Mamoon, 2005). Londoño 
and Székely (1997) estimate that the low level of education of Latin American 
workers and the enormous inequality in educational assets account for the 
largest portion of the region's excessive inequality, larger than other 
contributing factors – lower physical capital accumulation, the relative 
abundance of natural resources, and a high concentration of land resources. In 
Latin America, only a relatively small proportion of the total population has 
completed secondary or higher education. These relatively few skilled workers 
earn a substantial wage premium due to their limited supply. Thus a poor 
distribution of education contributes to differentials in the returns to different 
levels of education, magnifying the effect of education gaps on income 
inequality. 
Results in table 4 show that average years of schooling and adult literacy 
rate are significantly and negatively related with wage inequality, confirming 
that countries where education is more equally distributed or levels of average 
schooling are higher; wage inequality would be less severe. Though Altr is 
weakly related with the income shares, results for Sch do imply that education 
has a strong redistributive power from richer segments of the society to the 
less affluent. A comparison of coefficients of Middle20 and Low10 suggests that 
education benefits middle class more than the poor.  
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5.5 Integration and Inequality 
Table 5 (appendix II) show results of IV augmented regression coefficients for 
several openness and trade policy proxies when the dependent variable is Theil 
Index. First we would like to mention here that on the line of Dollar and Kraay 
(2004), we have also found that there is no systematic relationship between 
changes in trade volumes and changes in household income inequality (Gini). 
So here we only discuss the results based on Theil Index.  
The rationale for expecting an effect of trade on wage inequality is based 
on the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) trade model. As 
Slaughetr (2000) puts it: ‘… [Free] trade lowers the real wage of the scarce factor and 
raises that of the abundant factor compared to autarky’ (p. 131). Assuming that 
developed countries are generally abundant in skilled labor, increasing trade 
with developing countries, which are unskilled labor abundant, should raise the 
wages of skilled workers relative to unskilled in developed countries. However, 
wage inequality may also be an outcome of more trade in the developing 
country context. An explanation for rising wage inequality after liberalization 
can be that developing countries protect the unskilled intensive of the two 
goods, and not the skill intensive prior to liberalization. So after liberalization 
the producers of unskilled intensive good face increased costs amid more 
outside competition in the absence of government subsidies. Thus an increased 
downward pressure is exerted to the wages of the unskilled labor force 
employed in the production of that unskilled good. Mamoon (2004) has 
identified at least 9 different effects through which wage inequality increases as 
an outcome of more international trade. In table 5, the results for openness 
indicators confirm that increased globalisation captured by an increase in the 
movement of goods and services leads to augmentation in wage inequality. 
However, the results for trade policy are mixed. The trade policy variables 
which have a significant relationship with wage inequality are overall trade 
taxes (Txtrdg), total import charges (Totimpov) and non tariff coverage (Ntarfov). 
Totimpov and Ntarfov are negatively associated with wage inequality and the 
relationship is significant in 8 out of 10 cases for Totimpov and 3 out of 10 for 
Ntarfov. The results depict that if a country follow a more open policy by 
decreasing import taxes as well as non tariff barriers, it will have a positive 
effect on wage inequality. In developed countries, wage inequality is a 
phenomenon caused by increase in outsourcing to the developing countries. 
Thus high import taxes may be a used as a protection policy to provide some 
kind of breathing space to lower skilled worker who are increasingly loosing 
jobs to developing country labour force. Increase in wage inequality in 
developing countries may be explained by lower import taxes or non tariff 
barriers by suggesting that due to their comparative disadvantage in skilled 
labour production activities domestically and protection against their unskilled 
intensive agricultural goods in developed countries. Our third significant 
variable (Txtrdg) has a positive relationship with wage inequality and it is 
significant in 5 out of 10 cases. This suggests that any decrease in trade taxes 
(export taxes specifically ) will lead to a decrease in wage inequality. Promoting 
exports have an egalitarian effect then accepting imports. Here the conflicting 
results among different measures of trade policy are due to the fact that 
decreasing the price for exporting goods may lead to their higher demand 
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following economies of scale argument and thus rise in wages of the most 
extensively used labour, whereas protection on imports may make more sense 
considering lack of consensus among developed and developing countries in 
simultaneously decreasing levels of protection in their import substitution 
sectors. Decreasing import taxes may have strong political effects in both 
developed and developing countries if not done simultaneously by both 
economic groups. That is the reason why World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
talks have yet to reach a consensus. However, here one may give a policy 
recommendation that at least decreasing export taxes by any country 
irrespective of its belonging to any economic group may help to wage the gap 
between skilled and unskilled labour because more exports may mean more 
growth. Decreasing export taxes in a country should also be supplemented by a 
smart export promotion policy to compete in the international markets. 
However, one may take caution on this because generally the least developed 
countries export capacity to developed nations has been curtailed due to high 
protection in agriculture sector. Developing countries are able to export more 
semi skilled or skilled intensive goods as can be seen in Indian and Chinese 
case. Trade among developing countries has yet to reach optimal levels. In 
such a scenario, taking out developed country from the sample, results for 
Txtrdg might change. Decrease in export taxes may increase inequality in such 
a scenario as we find in another paper. (See Dawood and Mansoob, 2007).  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is an attempt to gauge the effects of different institutions on 
inequality. Though the literature is limited on the subject, the existing one 
suggests that there are two way causalities between institutions and inequality. 
To this effect we solve the problem of endogeniety by utilising a set of 
instruments already in use for institutions. We used a rich set of openness and 
trade policy variables as controls in our multiple regression equations.  
Our results have reconfirmed that good quality institutions lead to 
decrease in inequality. It also appears that it is political stability that is more 
important than democracy. In line to previous studies, we find that it may not 
matter much whether a country is working under a democracy or autocracy, 
but it is good policies of the leaders which eventually determine the welfare 
enhancing effects through preservation of property rights etc. Good leadership 
which not only follow more market friendly policies but also keep institutional 
development at the fore of their policy choice is a key to economic 
development. Tables 6 (appendix II) summarises our results on institutions on 
the basis of relative significance, and shows that political stability, rule of law, 
control for corruption and government effectiveness are the key institutions 
regarding inequality mitigation. If education is more equally distributed among 
the population, relative wages of skilled and unskilled labour will have least 
amount of distortions especially when the country opens up to international 
trade. Among economic institutions, regulation is less important when 
compared to government’s independent fiscal and monetary policy and its 
effective capacity to decentralise and its pro business orientation. Table 6 also 
show that Middle class comes out to be the main beneficiary of good quality 
 22
institutions than any other income group as Middle20 equations give most 
significant results.  
Regarding integration we find that openness is generally related with 
higher wage inequality, though its impact on income inequality is insignificant 
at best. This result is also in line with recent literature. However we also find 
that level of openness or trade policies may carry significant positive effects in 
widening the wage gaps between skilled and unskilled labour. The reason for 
the continuous failure of WTO talks has also been supported by our study as 
our results show that opening up of protected sectors to increased 
international competition by revoking import taxes lead to higher wage 
inequality. The paper recommends more regional trade where by developing 
countries trade among each other if due to protection their exporting 
capabilities to the developed countries have been strangled especially in case of 
agriculture produce. For example, in countries like China and India, the pace of 
development suggests that both countries are fast climbing the technology 
ladder and would form significant pockets of services sector oriented high 
technology dependent production areas which may draw similarities with 
developed nations in both supply and demand and relative factor prices. Trade 
within developing countries may seek to exploit such emerging pockets. 
Countries like Pakistan may also increasingly join in if regional economics is 
put on priority and conflict of interest are resolved or set aside for preparing 
economic grounds for social harmony within their populations.  
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APPENDIX I 
TABLE 1a:  
IV Augmented Regression Coefficients for Legal Institutions (Va and Rl) 
Dependent Variables Independent 
Variables 
Theil Gini High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
Va (Lcopen) -0.02 -3.42 -4.04 1.43 0.259 -4.37 
 (-1.50) (-0.63) (-2.92)* (4.74)* (1.71)*** (-4.20)* 
Va (Impnov85) -0.03 2.73 -4.53 1.39 0.17 -3.99 
 (-2.07)** (0.30) (-2.28)** (3.38)* (0.87) (-2.82)* 
Va (Impnov82) -0.02 -5.60 -4.29 1.51 0.26 -4.50 
 (-1.64)*** (-3.36)* (-2.62)* (4.05)* (1.49) (-3.51)* 
Va (Tarshov85) -0.03 4.95 -4.68 1.42 0.187 -4.07 
 (-2.27)** (0.51) (-2.25)** (3.31)* (0.91) (-2.76)* 
Va (Tarshov82) -0.04 -0.04 -4.81 1.52 0.28 -4.48 
 (-2.48)** (-2.48)** (-2.57)** (3.91)* (1.51) (-3.37)* 
Va (Open80s) -0.06 9.09 -6.18 1.13 -0.11 -3.01 
 (-1.12) (0.38) (-1.28) (1.54) (-0.24) (-1.14) 
Va (Tariffs) -0.05 -19.34 -16.18 3.91 2.34 -11.68 
 (-0.75) (-1.03) (-0.90) (1.10) (0.89) (-1.05) 
Va (Owti) -0.05 27.60 -4.14 1.50 0.23 -4.39 
 (-2.21)** (1.09) (-1.42) (2.13)** (0.64) (-1.81)*** 
Va (Txtrdg) 0.08 -12.74 -7.76 3.15 0.82 -10.76 
 (1.10) (-2.25)** (-1.58) (2.52)** (1.46) (-2.40)** 
Va (Totimpov) 0.01 1.33 -0.34 -0.56 -0.69 2.59 
 (0.47) (0.05) (-0.08) (-0.76) (-1.84)*** (1.02) 
Va (Owqi) -0.07 5.44 0.924 0.27 -0.46 0.054 
 (-1.24) (0.30) (0.17) (0.17) (-0.52) (1.01) 
Va (Ntarfov) -0.03 18.95 -3.77 0.16 -0.26 -0.06 
 (-0.67) (0.74) (-0.72) (0.17) (-0.52) (-0.02) 
Rl (Lcopen) -0.02 -2.77 -5.08 1.82 0.48 -5.75 
 (-1.48) (-0.46) (-3.44)* (5.59)* (3.03)* (-5.14)* 
Rl (Impnov85) -0.04 -5.76 -5.49 1.81 0.48 -5.61 
 (2.30)** (-0.62) (-2.76)* (4.48)* (2.50)** (-4.04)* 
Rl (Impnov82) -0.03 -7.23 -5.23 1.77 0.49 -5.55 
 (-1.80)*** (-4.39)* (-2.91)* (4.81)* (2.79)* (-4.39)* 
Rl (Tarshov85) -0.04 7.39 -5.66 1.86 0.52 -5.79 
 (-2.49)** (0.77) (-2.77)* (4.46)* (2.63)* (-4.05)* 
Rl (Tarshov82) -0.04 -7.33 -5.31 1.79 0.50 -5.61 
 (-2.43)** (-4.27)* (-2.82)* (4.69)* (2.75)* (-4.26)* 
Rl (Open80s) -0.02 18.97 -9.05 2.43 1.09 -8.32 
 (-0.70) (0.94) (-2.15)** (3.76)* (2.68)* (-3.60)* 
Rl (Tariffs) 0.02 -18.23 -10.64 3.44 2.24 -12.07 
 (0.33) (-2.33)** (-1.85)*** (2.51)* (2.00)** (-2.41)** 
Rl (Owti) -0.05 19.88 -6.22 2.31 0.97 -7.69 
 (-2.22)** (1.15) (-2.51)** (3.69)* (2.78)* (-3.44)* 
Rl (Txtrdg) 0.02 -15.05 -9.16 3.37 1.31 -11.24 
 (0.74) (-2.77)* (-2.17)** (2.95)* (2.26)** (-2.85)* 
Rl (Totimpov) 0.007 22.50 -8.57 1.59 0.61 -5.06 
 (0.18) (0.59) (-1.30) (1.42) (1.14) (-1.30) 
Rl (Owqi) -0.09 16.56 -1.09 1.13 0.17 -3.05 
 (-1.04) (0.54) (-0.24) (1.06) (0.33) (-0.76) 
Rl (Ntarfov) 0.02 30.20 -12.71 2.82 1.38 -9.71 
 (0.48) (0.92) (-1.60) (1.80)*** (1.58) (-1.72)*** 
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parenthesis 
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TABLE 1b 
Augmented Regression Coefficients for Legal Institutions (Ctc) 
Dependent Variables Independent 
Variables 
Theil Gini High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
Ctc (Lcopen) -0.02 -2.79 -5.39 1.87 0.46 -5.88 
 (-1.44) (-0.44) (-3.31)* (5.47)* (2.76)* (-5.03)* 
Ctc (Impnov85) -0.03 4.85 -5.01 1.64 0.37 -5.01 
 (-2.21)** (0.54) (-2.52)* (4.32)* (2.05)** (-3.88)* 
Ctc (Impnov82) -0.02 -6.45 -4.81 1.62 0.41 05.02 
 (-1.71)*** (-4.22)* (-2.69)* (4.72)* (2.42)** (-4.29)* 
Ctc (Tarshov85) -0.03 6.71 -5.20 1.69 0.41 -5.19 
 (-2.41)** (0.71) (-2.52)* (4.29)* (2.15)** (-3.87)* 
Ctc (Tarshov82) -0.04 -6.51 -4.88 1.64 0.41 -5.04 
 (-2.41)** (-4.06)* (-2.60)* (4.55)* (2.35)** (-4.12)* 
Ctc (Open80s) -0.02 17.32 -9.33 2.47 1.03 -8.38 
 (-0.70) (0.79) (-1.89)*** (3.32)* (2.34)** (-3.25)* 
Ctc (Tariffs) 0.05 -22.77 -13.10 4.32 2.77 -15.19 
 (0.57) (-1.74)*** (-1.45) (1.87)*** (1.54) (-1.81)*** 
Ctc (Owti) -0.05 22.76 -6.29 2.35 0.91 -7.74 
 (-2.19)** (1.13) (-2.19)** (3.31)* (2.44)** (-3.11)* 
Ctc (Txtrdg) 0.02 -12.50 -7.56 2.84 1.04 -9.89 
 (0.94) (-2.99)* (-2.12)** (3.20)* (2.30)** (-3.09)* 
Ctc (Totimpov) 0.02 17.59 -5.13 0.33 -0.32 -0.27 
 (0.34) (0.43) (-0.73) (0.30) (-0.59) (-0.07) 
Ctc (Owqi) -0.10 12.77 0.12 0.79 -0.10 -1.78 
 (-0.94) (0.45) (0.02) (0.63) (-0.14) (-0.36) 
Ctc (Ntarfov) 0.04 46.44 -15.14 2.82 1.06 -9.29 
 (0.34) (1.04) (-1.33) (1.37) (1.02) (-1.29) 
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses 
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TABLE 2 
Augmented Regression Coefficients for Economic Institutions (Ge and Rq) 
Dependent Variables Independent 
Variables 
Theil Gini High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
Ge (Lcopen) -0.025 -5.18 -6.56 2.19 0.552 -6.817 
 (-1.54) (-0.74) (-3.61)* (5.63)* (2.97)* (-5.17)* 
Ge (Impnov85) -0.039 3.25 -6.47 2.02 0.49 -6.17 
 (-2.34)** (0.33) (2.87)* (4.56)* (2.40)** (-4.13)* 
Ge (Impnov82) -0.028 -7.86 -6.13 1.97 0.51 -6.08 
 (-1.86)*** (-4.37)* (-2.99)* (4.84)* (2.67)* (-4.43)* 
Ge (Tarshov85) -0.04 4.86 -6.67 2.08 0.53 -6.37 
 (2.55)** (0.48) (-2.89)* (4.53)* (2.49)** (-4.12)* 
Ge (Tarshov82) -0.04 -7.87 -6.21 1.98 0.51 -6.07 
 (-2.53)** (-4.20)* (-2.90)* (4.68)* (2.57)* (-4.25)* 
Ge (Open80s) -0.05 24.23 -11.46 2.72 0.96 -8.91 
 (-1.30) (0.90) (-1.89)*** (3.02)* (2.00)** (-2.92)* 
Ge (Tariffs) 0.07 -25.83 -15.53 4.99 3.11 -17.08 
 (0.39) (-1.56) (-1.36) (1.69)*** (1.38) (-1.63) 
Ge (Owti) -0.07 15.37 -8.17 3.02 1.12 -9.79 
 (-2.40)** (1.08) (-2.29)** (3.25)* (2.44)** (-3.04)* 
Ge (Txtrdg) 0.04 -14.73 -8.72 3.40 1.18 -11.76 
 (0.94) (-2.64)** (-1.93)*** (2.80)* (2.09)** (-2.71)* 
Ge (Totimpov) -0.01 14.53 -4.59 0.18 -0.48 0.75 
 (-0.13) (0.35) (-0.63) (0.16) (-0.84) (0.19) 
Ge (Owqi) -0.09 7.04 -1.47 1.26 0.04 -3.28 
 (-1.08) (0.31) (-0.33) (1.16) (0.07) (-0.80) 
Ge (Ntarfov) -0.05 47.62 -17.76 3.42 1.19 -10.64 
 (-0.47) (0.88) (-1.27) (1.30) (0.98) (-1.21) 
Rq (Lcopen) -0.03 -5.43 -4.48 1.72 0.10 -5.01 
 (-1.44) (-0.59) (-1.93)*** (3.10)* (0.40) (2.65)* 
Rq (Impnov85) -0.04 2.09 -4.72 1.44 -0.07 -3.75 
 (-1.73)*** (0.14) (-1.48) (2.05)** (-0.23) (-1.54) 
Rq (Impnov82) -0.03 -5.54 -5.30 1.71 0.05 -4.73 
 (-1.37) (-1.85)*** (-1.73)*** (2.52)* (0.16) (-2.30)** 
Rq (Tarshov85) -0.05 5.69 -4.66 1.39 -0.09 -3.53 
 (-1.92)*** (0.37) (-1.40) (1.92)*** (-0.28) (-1.41) 
Rq (Tarshov82) -0.05 -4.86 -5.00 1.53 0.02 -4.09 
 (-2.13)*** (-1.61) (-1.60) (2.24)** (0.07) (-1.74)*** 
Rq (Open80s) -0.02 21.53 -4.44 -0.14 -1.22 2.34 
 (-0.36) (0.62) (-0.62) (-0.10) (-1.43) (0.47) 
Rq (Tariffs) 0.04 3.53 -3.09 -4.40 -0.46 3.50 
 (0.46) (0.29) (-0.32) (-0.15) (-0.40) (0.36) 
Rq (Owti) -0.05 43.10 0.47 0.25 -0.73 0.50 
 (-1.57) (1.14) (0.10) (0.18) (-1.01) (0.10) 
Rq (Txtrdg) 0.15 -26.61 -16.89 6.64 1.67 -22.75 
 (1.19) (-1.68)*** (-1.36) (1.82)*** (1.21) (-1.77)*** 
Rq (Totimpov) -0.005 1.29 3.60 -1.87 -1.47 7.49 
 (-0.11) (0.04) (0.56) (-1.66) (-2.40)** (1.91)*** 
Rq (Owqi) -0.08 5.43 3.93 0.53 -0.32 2.56 
 (-1.23) (0.22) (0.45) (0.17) (-0.15) (0.27) 
Rq (Ntarfov) -0.13 65.02 -3.70 -1.00 -0.97 4.48 
 (-1.15) (1.15) (-0.37) (-0.58) (-1.03) (0.74) 
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses 
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TABLE 3a 
Augmented Regression Coefficients for Political Institutions (Ps) 
Dependent Variables Independent 
Variables 
Theil Gini High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
Ps (Lcopen) -0.03 -4.68 -6.39 2.19 0.58 -6.87 
 (-1.57) (-0.64) (-3.57)* (5.49)* (3.11)* (-5.10)* 
Ps (Impnov85) -0.04 4.08 -6.72 2.17 0.54 -6.68 
 (-2.23)** (0.37) (-2.67)* (4.03)* (2.28)** (-3.69)* 
Ps (Impnov82) -0.03 -8.38 -6.31 2.09 0.54 -6.47 
 (-1.76)*** (-3.85)* (-2.72)* (4.20)* (2.41)* (-3.87)* 
Ps (Tarshov85) -0.04 5.87 -6.95 2.24 0.59 -6.91 
 (-2.41)** (0.52) (-2.69)* (3.99)* (2.38)** (-3.68)* 
Ps (Tarshov82) -0.04 -8.73 -6.54 2.17 0.57 -6.69 
 (-2.38)** (-3.81)* (-2.70)* (4.13)* (2.48)** (-3.81)* 
Ps (Open80s) -0.05 31.25 -13.32 3.21 1.25 -10.64 
 (-1.14) (1.06) (-1.95)*** (2.80)* (2.12)** (-2.70)* 
Ps (Tariffs) -0.002 -22.35 -13.51 4.32 2.69 -14.72 
 (-0.02) (-1.87)*** (-1.59) (2.01)** (1.61) (-1.95)*** 
Ps (Owti) -0.07 25.14 -7.36 2.84 1.09 -9.31 
 (-2.33)** (1.13) (-2.27)** (3.13)* (2.39)** (-2.94)* 
Ps (Txtrdg) -0.03 -14.12 -8.26 3.25 1.14 -11.23 
 (-0.29) (-3.37)* (-2.09)** (3.64)* (2.47)** (-3.54)* 
Ps (Totimpov) o.ooo3 17.57 -4.33 -0.03 -0.69 1.45 
 (0.01) (0.39) (-0.55) (-0.03) (-1.05) (0.33) 
Ps (Owqi) -0.09 15.14 -1.16 1.28 0.10 -3.40 
 (-1.10) (0.50) (-0.23) (1.05) (0.17) (-0.75) 
Ps (Ntarfov) -0.03 67.45 -14.16 1.98 0.42 -5.59 
 (-0.42) (1.33) (-1.19) (0.98) (0.44) (-0.82) 
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parenthesis 
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TABLE 3b 
IV Augmented Regression Coefficients for Political Institutions  
(Demo and Auto) 
Dependent Variables Independent 
Variables 
Theil Gini High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
Demo (Lcopen) -0.004 -0.93 -0.649 0.23 -0.01 -0.63 
 (-1.25) (-0.63) (-1.66)*** (2.68)* (-0.25) (-2.15)** 
Demo (Impnov85) -0.005 0.53 -0.79 0.21 -0.01 -0.51 
 (-1.53) (0.24) (-1.65)*** (2.13)** (-0.02) (-1.56) 
Demo (Impnov82) -0.004 (-0.88) -0.915 0.27 0.02 -0.74 
 (-1.04) (-2.15)** (-1.99)** (2.93)* (0.36) (-2.41)** 
Demo (Tarshov85) -0.006 1.15 -0.79 0.19 -0.01 -0.45 
 (-1.77)*** (0.50) (-1.56) (1.90)** (-0.27) (-1.33) 
Demo (Tarshov82) -0.005 -0.91 -0.97 0.27 0.02 -0.73 
 (-1.50) (-2.10)** (-2.02)** (2.79)* (0.51) (-2.27)** 
Demo (Open80s) -0.007 3.51 -0.67 -0.02 -0.17 0.34 
 (-1.15) (0.69) (-0.67) (-0.11) (-1.32) (0.48) 
Demo (Tariffs) -0.01 2.08 0.43 -0.39 -0.24 1.58 
 (-1.81)*** (0.93) (0.33) (-0.81) (-1.10) (0.92) 
Demo (Owti) -0.007 5.84 0.13 -0.05 -0.13 0.41 
 (-1.99)** (1.11) (0.19) (-0.24) (-1.12) (0.53) 
Demo (Txtrdg) 0.023 -1.83 -1.16 0.52 0.06 -1.72 
 (1.14) (-1.74)*** (-1.13) (2.20)** (0.55) (-2.06)** 
Demo (Totimpov) 0.0009 -0.64 0.59 0.24 -0.19 0.97 
 (0.17) (-0.14) (0.74) (1.84)*** (-2.86)* (2.11)** 
Demo (Owqi) -0.01 3.04 0.40 -0.07 -0.13 0.458 
 (-1.47) (0.55) (0.06) (-0.17) (-0.72) (0.31) 
Demo (Ntarfov) -0.007 4.47 0.44 -0.19 -0.12 1.52 
 (-1.13) (0.94) (0.85) (-1.28) (-1.50) (-0.61) 
Auto (Lcopen) 0.006 1.20 0.70 -0.17 0.07 0.38 
 (1.24) (0.61) (1.11) (-1.49) (1.23) (0.98) 
Auto (Impnov85) 0.006 -0.19 0.92 -0.16 0.06 0.29 
 (1.35) (-0.06) (1.45) (-1.20) (0.96) (0.65) 
Auto (Impnov82) 0.0041 0.69 0.64 -0.26 0.03 0.63 
 (0.85) (1.17) (0.97) (-1.94)*** (0.49) (1.43) 
Auto (Tarshov85) 0.006 0.99 0.94 -0.12 0.07 0.17 
 (1.60) (-0.33) (1.43) (-0.92) (1.06) (0.37) 
Auto (Tarshov82) 0.005 0.63 -0.19 -0.23 0.02 0.55 
 (1.34) (1.06) (-0.18) (-1.74)*** (0.38) (1.22) 
Auto (Open80s) 0.004 -1.88 -0.47 0.26 0.27 -1.16 
 (0.75) (-0.39) (-0.38) (1.11) (2.02)** (-1.39) 
Auto (Tariffs) 0.01 -1.89 -0.71 0.361 0.21 -1.14 
 (2.39)** (-1.16) (-0.75) (1.00) (1.38) (-1.15) 
Auto (Owti) 0.008 -5.80 -0.55 0.23 0.22 -1.04 
 (2.04)** (-1.08) (-0.34) (0.77) (1.60) (-1.04) 
Auto (Txtrdg) -0.02 -0.70 -0.88 -0.04 0.25 -0.03 
 (-0.97) (-0.44) (-0.93) (-0.12) (1.28) (-0.03) 
Auto (Totimpov) 0.0002 1.04 -0.62 -0.31 0.23 -1.28 
 (0.04) (0.19) (-0.44) (-2.07)** (2.88)* (-2.34)** 
Auto (Owqi) 0.011 -2.96 -0.25 0.13 0.18 -0.68 
 (1.88)*** (-0.53) (-0.62) (0.26) (0.91) (-0.40) 
Auto (Ntarfov) 0.008 -5.68 -0.44 0.27 0.16 -1.11 
 (1.46) (-1.06) (-0.25) (1.59) (1.64) (-1.83)*** 
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses 
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TABLE 4 
IV Augmented Regression Coefficients for Social Institutions (Sch and Altr) 
Dependent Variables Independent 
Variables 
Theil Gini High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10 
Sch (Lcopen) -0.02 -2.41 -1.07 0.58 0.17 -1.90 
 (-4.37)* (-4.18)* (-2.75)* (4.49)* (2.89)* (-4.03)* 
 Sch (Impnov85) -0.02 -2.08 -0.79 0.48 0.16 -1.57 
 (-3.73)* (-3.07)* (-1.80)*** (3.29)* (2.14)** (-3.06)* 
Sch (Impnov82) -0.03 -2.12 -0.85 0.50 0.15 -1.63 
 (-3.79)* (-3.24)* (-1.99)** (3.52)* (2.11)** (-3.30)* 
Sch (Tarshov85) -0.02 -2.16 -0.79 0.49 0.17 -1.60 
 (-3.72)* (-3.06)* (-1.73)*** (3.24)* (2.26)** (-3.00)* 
Sch (Tarshov82) -0.02 -2.20 -0.86 0.51 0.17 -1.66 
 (-3.85)* (-3.29)* (-1.96)*** (3.52)* (2.28)** (-3.28)* 
Sch (Open80s) -0.02 -0.62 -0.12 0.16 0.004 -0.56 
 (-2.92)* (-0.56) (-0.20) (0.71) (0.03) (-0.69) 
Sch (Tariffs) -0.004 -5.32 -1.92 1.12 0.52 -3.56 
 (-0.24) (-1.37) (-1.02) (1.43)* (1.19) (-1.37) 
Sch (Owti) -0.02 -1.59 -0.27 0.33 0.15 -1.10 
 (-3.17)* (-1.54) (-0.38) (1.36) (1.43) (-1.34) 
Sch(Txtrdg) -0.01 -2.64 -1.38 0.64 0.14 -2.18 
 (-1.45) (-2.51)** (-1.89)*** (2.70)* (1.26) (-2.63)* 
Sch (Totimpov) -0.02 0.86 0.82 -0.12 -0.14 0.46 
 (-2.05)** (0.62) (0.74) (-0.38) (-0.97) (0.42) 
Sch (Owqi) -0.01 0.7 0.34 0.07 -0.09 -0.26 
 (-2.47)** (0.02) (0.23) (0.13) (-0.35) (-0.14) 
Sch (Ntarfov) -0.04 2.50 1.93 -0.51 -0.27 1.77 
 (-1.02) (0.90) (0.90) (-0.75) (-1.15) (0.77) 
Altr (Lcopen) -0.002 -0.17 -0.12 0.04 0.01 -0.14 
 (-2.41)** (-2.89)* (-2.06)** (3.03)* (2.06)** (-2.99)* 
Altr (Impnov85) -0.002 -0.10 -0.10 0.02 0.007 -0.07 
 (-3.11)* (-1.28) (-1.25) (1.31) (0.89) (-1.17) 
Altr (Impnov82) -0.002 -0.11 -0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.09 
 (-3.12)* (-1.45) (-1.38) (1.55) (0.88) (-1.50) 
Altr (Tarshov85) -0.002 -0.10 -0.10 0.03 0.01 -0.07 
 (-3.25)* (-1.24) (-1.21) (1.24) (0.99) (-1.17) 
Altr (Tarshov82) -0.001 -0.12 -0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.09 
 (-1.78)*** (-1.49) (-1.40) (1.54) (1.07) (--1.47) 
Altr (Open80s) -0.0001 0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 
 (-0.07) (0.54) (0.15) (-0.37) (-0.92) (0.35) 
Altr (Tariffs) -0.002 0.36 0.24 -0.08 -0.03 0.25 
 (-2.72)* (1.00) (0.83) (-0.96) (-1.05) (0.93) 
Altr (Owti) -0.001 0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.001 0.02 
 (-1.10) (0.19) (0.84) (-0.24) (-0.13) (0.17) 
Altr (Txtrdg) -0.001 -0.10 -0.05 0.02 -0.002 -0.12 
 (-1.10) (-0.78) (-0.37) (0.99) (-0.23) (-1.04) 
Altr (Totimpov) (-0.001) 0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.09 
 (-1.88)*** (1.72)*** (0.16) (0.49) (-1.80)*** (1.43) 
Altr (Owqi) -0.001 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 
 (-2.44)** (-0.38) (0.00) (-1.54) (0.00) (-0.52) 
Altr (Ntarfov) -0.001 0.19 0.11 -0.04 -0.02 0.14 
 (-1.58) (1.58) (0.58) (-1.41) (-1.77)*** (1.37) 
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 




IV Augmented Regression Coefficients for Openness / Trade Policy  
Dependent Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Independent 
Variables 
(Va) (Rl) (Ctc) (Rq) (Ge) (Ps) (Demo) (Auto) (Sch) (Altr) 
Lcopen  0.032 0.036 0.039 0.029 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.035 0.013 0.004 
 (1.54) (1.68)*** (1.77)*** (1.39) (1.82)*** (1.78)*** (1.70)*** (1.41) (0.89) (0.16) 
Impnov85 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0002 0.0003 
 (2.66)* (2.87)* (2.88)* (2.48)** (3.01)* (2.86)* (2.57)* (2.28)** (0.38) (0.46) 
Impnov82  0.001 0.002 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0003 0.0005 
 (2.68)* (2.91)* (2.92)* (2.63)* (3.06)* (2.93)* (2.67)* (2.41)** (0.42) 0.80) 
Tarshov85 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.0002 
 (2.84)* (3.06)* (3.08)* (2.66)* (3.24)* (3.06)* (2.75)* (2.44)** (0.32) (0.51) 
Tarshov82 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.0004 
 (2.62)* (2.56)* (2.65)* (2.44)** (2.74)* (2.59)* (2.20)** (1.98)** (0.43) (0.88) 
Open80s 0.007 -0.033 -0.025 -0.062 0.052 0.030 -0.007 -0.047 0.047 -0.042 
 (0.51) (-0.41) (-0.28) (-0.08) (0.46) (0.28) (-0.09) (-0.84) (0.60) (-0.61) 
Tariffs -0.004 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.006 
 (-0.34) (0.80) (0.89) (1.11) (0.55) (0.37) (-0.96) (-0.63) (0.81) (1.19) 
Owti -0.230 -0.324 -0.302 -0.149 -0.425 -0.366 -0.136 -0.058 -0.129 -0.086) 
 (-1.34) (-1.53) (-1.50) (-0.86) (-1.78)*** (-1.63) (-0.96) (-0.49) (-0.86) (-0.65) 
Txtrdg 4.810 2.281 2.504 4.509 2.986 2.441 5.713 4.364 1.079 0.777 
 (1.50) (1.84)*** (1.91)*** (1.63) (1.75)*** (2.03)** (1.46) (1.39) (1.76)*** (1.15) 
Totimpov -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-2.32)** (-1.82)*** (-1.70)*** (-2.31)** (-1.84)*** (-2.04)** (-2.56)* (-2.33)** (-1.18) (-1.45) 
Owqi -0.800 -1.082 -1.243 -0.522 -1.101 -1.010 -0.487 -0.264 0.050 0.041 
 (-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.85) (-0.98) (-0.95) (-0.94) (-1.01) (-0.94) (0.27) (0.23) 
Ntarfov -0.002 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.0004 
 (-1.64) (-0.82) (-0.26) (-1.66)*** (-1.04) (-1.30) (-2.09)** (-2.12)** (-0.73) (-0.52) 
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parenthesis. 
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TABLE 6 
Significance Count of Institutions 
Dependent Variables Independent Variables 




Total cases of 
correct signs 
Legal Institutions         
Voice and Accountability (Va) 
(Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
7 out of 12 
(0 out of 7) 
2 out of 12 
(1 out of 2)* 
7 out of 12 
(7 out of 7) 
29 out of 72 
 
28 out of 29 
 
Rule of Law (Rl) 
(Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
4 out of 12 
(4 out of 4) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
10 out of 12 
(0 out of 10) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
10 out of 12 
(10 out of 10) 
47 out of 72 
 
47 out of 47 
 
Control of Corruption (Ctc) 
(Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
4 out of 12 
(4 out of 4) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
8 out of 12 
(0 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
45 out of 72 45 out of 45 
Economic Institutions         
Government Effectiveness (Ge) 
(Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
8 out of 12 
(0 out of 8) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
41 out of 72 41 out of 41 
Regulatory Quality (Rq) 
(Negative sign) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
2 out of 12 
(2 out of 2) 
2 out of 12 
(2 out of 2) 
6 out of 12 
(0 out of 6) 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1)* 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
19 out of 72 18 out of 19 
Political Institutions         
Democracy (Dem) 
(Negative sign) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
4 out of 12 
(4 out of 4) 
7 out of 12 
(0 out of 7) 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1)* 
5 out of 12 
(4 out of 5)* 
30 out of 72 28 out of 30 
Autocracy (Aut) 
(Negative signs) 
3 out of 12 
(0 out of 12) 
0 out of 12 
(0 out of 0) 
0 out of 12 
(0 out of 0) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
2 out of 12 
(0 out of 2)* 
2 out of 12 
(2 out of 2) 
10 out of 72 8 out of 10 
Political Stability (Ps) 
(Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
4 out of 12 
(4 out of 4) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
8 out of 12 
(0 out of 12) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
53 out of 72 53 out of 53 
Social Institutions         
Average Schooling Years (Sch) 
(Negative sign) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
6 out of 12 
(6 out of 6) 
6 out of 12 
(6 out of 6) 
7 out of 12 
(0 out of 7) 
5 out of 12 
(0 out of 5) 
6 out of 12 
(6 out of 6) 
39 out of 72 39 out of 39 
Adult Literacy Rate (Altr) 
(Negative sign) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
2 out of 12 
(1 out of 2)* 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1) 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1) 
3 out of 12 
(1 out of 3)* 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1) 
16 out of 72 14 out of 16 
Cases of Significance (by columns) 51 out of 120 31 out of 120 51 out of 120 68 out of 120 47 out of 120 62 out of 120 - - 
* Observation made that a variable has entered the equation significantly but with a wrong sign 
Significance is observed at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
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DATA AND SOURCES 
Altr: Adult Literacy Rate, Year: 1999, Source: WDI (2002) 
Auto: Autocracy, Year: 1999, Source: Polity IV dataset  
Ctc: Control for Corruption, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al. (2002) 
Demo: Democracy, (numeric) Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high), Democracy Score: 
general openness of political institutions. The 11-point Democracy scale is 
constructed additively. Year: 1999, Source: Polity IV dataset 
Disteq: Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90. Source: 
Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
Engfrac: Fraction of the population speaking English. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian 
& Trebbi (2002) 
Eurfrac: Fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western 
Europe: English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. Source: Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
Ge: Government Effectiveness, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al. (2002) 
Gini: Coefficient in Percentage Points as calculated by WIDER. Year: 1995, Source: 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
High10: Highest Income Decile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
High20: Fifth Income Percentile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm  
Sch: Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1999. Source: Barro 
R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Impnov85: Import Penetration: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impnov82: Import Penetration: overall, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Lcopen: Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of (nomnal) 
imports plus exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars), Year: 1985. Source: Penn 
World Tables, Mark 6. 
Logfrankrom (FR): Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following 
Frankel and Romer (1999) from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ 
variables. Source: Frankel and Romer (1999). 
Low10:Lowest Income Decile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
Low20: First Income Percentile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
Nontarfov: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: Overall, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
Open80s: Sachs and Warners (1995) composite openness index. Source: Rose (2002). 
Owqi: Non Trade Barriers Frequency on intermediate inputs, Capital goods, 1985. 
Source: Rose (2002). 
Owti: Tariffs on Intermediate and Capital Goods, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
Ps: Political Stability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al. (2002) 
Ptr: Pupil Teacher Ratio, Primary, Year: 1999, Source: WDI (2002) 
Rl: Rule of Law, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al. (2002) 
Rq: Regulatory Quality, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al. (2002) 
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Tarshov85: TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Tarshov82: TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Tariffs: Import Duties as %age imports, Year:1985. Source: World Development 
Indicators (WDI), 2002. 
Theil: UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure - calculated based on 
UNIDO2001 by UTIP, Year: 1997. Source: University of Texas Inequality 
Project (UTIP) http://utip.gov.utexas.edu. 
Tlex: Public Spending on Education, Total (as a percentage of GDP), Year: 1999, 
Source: WDI (2002) 
Thrd20: Third Income Percentile, Year: 1995, Source: UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
Totimpov: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: overall, 1985. Source: Rose 
(2002) 
Txtrg: Trade taxes / trade, 1982. Source: rose (2002) 
Va: Voice and Accountability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al. (2002) 
 
